The process is currently underway to remove the governor of California, which caused me to wonder if the president and vice president can be recalled. Surely, you would know the answer to this perplexing question!
There's no such thing as buyer's remorse when it comes to electing a president or a member of Congress. Or, to put it more accurately, you can regret voting for the person you voted for, but there's just not much you can about it at the federal level. Outside of impeachment, which we have been getting a crash course in over the last four years, and the 25th Amendment, there is no mechanism for voters to carry out a recall of the president.
You are more or less stuck with him. Sickness, resignation and assassination offer the only instances in the year history of the U. You don't have to be a scholar to know this.
The Constitution's silence on recall can be inferred from the fact that President Donald Trump never faced a recall effort. If the weapon had been available, is there any doubt it would have been used? On March 17, , the House Managers presented these articles of impeachment before the bar of the Senate.
Pursuant to S. Under S. After completing its work, the committee submitted a certified record of its proceedings to the Senate and filed its report summarizing the articles of impeachment and the evidence received.
On December 7, , the full Senate heard arguments on pending motions and on the merits of the case, then went into closed door deliberations on the motions and the articles of impeachment. On December 8, , the Senate, sitting as a Court of Impeachment, voted to convict Judge Porteous on all four of the articles of impeachment brought against him.
A judgment of removal from office flowed automatically from his conviction. In a rare additional judgment, the Senate disqualified him from holding federal office in the future.
Should the House vote to impeach and vote articles of impeachment specifying the grounds upon which impeachment is based, the matter is then presented to the Senate for trial.
Under the Constitution, the Senate has the sole power to try an impeachment. The decision whether to convict on each of the articles must be made separately. A conviction must be supported by a two-thirds majority of the Senators present. A conviction on any one of the articles of impeachment brought against an individual is sufficient to constitute conviction in the trial of the impeachment. Should a conviction occur, the Senate must determine what the appropriate judgment is in the case.
However, a separate vote is necessary should the Senate deem it appropriate to disqualify the individual convicted from holding future federal offices of public trust. Such a vote requires a simple majority.
Conviction on impeachment does not foreclose the possibility of criminal prosecution arising out of the same factual situation. The Constitution does not permit the President to extend executive clemency to anyone in order to preclude his or her impeachment by the House or trial or conviction by the Senate.
The President has no power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States in cases of impeachment. The impeachment process provides a mechanism for removal of the President, Vice President, and other federal civil officers found to have engaged in "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.
The Constitution limits the judgment to either removal from office or removal and prohibition against holding any future offices of "honor, Trust or Profit under the United States.
The American impeachment process places in the legislative branch the authority to remove the President, Vice President, and other federal civil officers in the executive and judicial branches upon a determination that such officers have engaged in treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.
It is one of the checks and balances grounded in the American constitutional structure. This report summarizes impeachment proceedings in the th Congress, examines relevant constitutional provisions, and provides a brief historical overview.
On March 4, , H. On March 11, , after one hour of debate, the House voted to impeach Judge Porteous. In four separate unanimous votes, the House agreed to each of the articles of impeachment. The Members appointed as House Managers for the Porteous impeachment trial appeared before the Senate to present the impeachment resolution, including the articles of impeachment brought against the judge, on March 17, The Senate, organized as a Court of Impeachment, then issued a summons to Judge Porteous requiring him to answer the articles brought against him by April 7, , and appointed an Impeachment Trial Committee of 12 Senators to take evidence in the case.
The impeachment investigation of Judge Porteous began during the th Congress. On June 17, , pursuant to 28 U. The Porteous impeachment investigation was not completed during the th Congress.
Because the House of Representatives is not a continuing body, in order for the House Judiciary Committee to continue its impeachment investigation in the th Congress, the House had to take action to renew the House Judiciary Committee's authority. On January 13, , the House passed H. The measure was referred the House Judiciary Committee the same day.
On March 4, , the resolution was reported by the committee and placed on the House Calendar. The House then approved H. After organizing as a Court of Impeachment, 9 the Senate agreed to two resolutions. Their replication was filed with the Senate on April 15, In this case, the Senate relied upon the Impeachment Trial Committee's evidence and report.
In addition, the Senate reviewed the post-trial filings of the House of Representatives and Judge Porteous.
The determination whether to convict or acquit on any article rests with the full Senate, as does the determination, upon conviction, of the judgment to be imposed.
The Constitution limits a judgment upon conviction in an impeachment trial to removal or removal and disqualification from holding further federal offices. On December 7, , the full Senate heard oral arguments from the parties on pending motions and on the merits of the case.
At the conclusion of final arguments presented by the House Managers and Judge Porteous, the Senate cleared the Senate Chamber and went into closed door deliberations on the motions and the articles of impeachment brought against Judge Porteous. On December 8, , the Senate voted to convict Judge Porteous on each of the four articles of impeachment. In rare additional judgment, the Senate, by a vote of 94 to 2, voted to disqualify Judge Porteous from holding any future federal office.
The impeachment investigation with respect to Judge Porteous is one of two impeachment inquiries regarding federal judges undertaken in the th Congress. Then the Senate, acting in that capacity, pursuant to S. The same day, pursuant to S. Kent is no longer a civil officer of the United States, the House of Representatives does not desire further to urge the articles of impeachment hitherto filed in the Senate against Samuel B.
Authority to remove the President, Vice President, and federal civil officers by impeachment has been placed, by constitutional mandate, in the hands of the legislative branch of the United States government.
Although rooted in the soil of English impeachment experience, the American impeachment system differs from its English forebear in some significant respects. Recorded incidents of English impeachments may begin as early as , and one source would place the first in It ceased to be used in England at about the time that it became part of the American system of government. The last two impeachments in England appear to have been those of Warren Hastings in and of Lord Melville in Unlike the British system, which permitted penal sanctions to attach upon conviction of impeachment, 36 the American system is designed to be remedial in function.
Despite surface similarities to a criminal trial, the judgments which may be rendered upon conviction of an article of impeachment in the American system are limited to removal from office and disqualification from holding further offices of public trust. Thus, the American system seems more designed to protect the public interest than to punish the person impeached. Nevertheless, much of the procedure and practice involved in this country's application of its impeachment process draws guidance and support from British precedents.
The somewhat skeletal constitutional framework for the impeachment process can be found in a number of provisions. These include the following:. The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two-thirds of the Members present. Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.
The President A number of principles can be drawn from these provisions. Impeachment applies only to the President, the Vice President, and those other federal officials or employees who fall within the category of "civil Officers of the United States. The power to determine whether impeachment is appropriate in a given instance rests solely with the House of Representatives.
The ultimate decisions both as to whether to impeach 38 and as to what articles of impeachment should be presented to the Senate for trial rest in the hands of the House. The Senate also has a unique role to play in the impeachment process. It alone has the authority and responsibility to try an impeachment brought by the House. The final decision as to whether to convict on any of the articles of impeachment is one that only the Senate can make.
As to each article, a conviction must rest upon a two-thirds majority vote of the Senators present. In addition, should an individual be convicted on any of the articles, the Senate must determine the appropriate judgment: either removal from office alone, or, alternatively, removal and disqualification from holding further offices of "honor, Trust or Profit under the United States.
A simple majority vote is required on such a judgment. The four most recent impeachments of federal judges after the conclusion of criminal proceedings against them, including that of Judge Kent, indicate that, at least as to federal judges, the impeachment need not precede criminal proceedings arising out of the same facts. Nor does an acquittal in the criminal proceedings preclude a subsequent impeachment.
While the constitutional provisions establish the basic framework for American impeachments, they do not begin to address all of the issues which may arise during the course of a given impeachment proceeding or to answer all of the procedural questions which might become pertinent to an inquiry of this sort. To fill this void, a number of resources are available.
While no court has challenged the authority of the Senate to try impeachments, there are decisions regarding questions raised by the impeachment trials and convictions of Judges Walter L. Nixon, Jr. United States , U. United States , F.
United States , supra , dismissed , F. That in the trial of any impeachment the Presiding Officer of the Senate, if the Senate so orders, shall appoint a committee of Senators to receive evidence and take testimony at such times and places as the committee may determine, and for such purpose the committee so appointed and the chairman thereof, to be elected by the committee, shall unless otherwise ordered by the Senate exercise all the powers and functions conferred upon the Senate and the Presiding Officer of the Senate, respectively, under the rules of procedure and practice in the Senate when sitting on impeachment trials.
Unless otherwise ordered by the Senate, the rules of procedure and practice in the Senate when sitting on impeachment trials shall govern the procedure and practice of the committee so appointed. The committee so appointed shall report to the Senate in writing a certified copy of the transcript of the proceedings and testimony had and given before the committee, and such report shall be received by the Senate and the evidence so received and the testimony so taken shall be considered to all intents and purposes, subject to the right of the Senate to determine competency, relevancy, and materiality, as having received and taken before the Senate, but nothing herein shall prevent the Senate from sending for any witness and hearing his testimony in open Senate, or by order of the Senate having the entire trial in open Senate.
Former Judge Nixon, "arguing that the Senate's failure to give him a full evidentiary hearing before the entire Senate violated its constitutional duty to "try" all impeachments[,] The district court held that his claim was nonjusticiable. The U. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed. Judge Williams, writing for the court, determined that the constitutional language granting the Senate the "sole Power to try all impeachments" also "gives it sole discretion to choose its procedures.
This "textual commitment of impeachment trials to the Senate," coupled with the need for finality, led the court to apply the political question doctrine in determining that the issue presented by former Judge Nixon was nonjusticiable.
Judge Randolph, in his concurrence, framed the question before the court as "whether the judiciary can pass upon the validity of the Senate's procedural decisions.
My conclusion that the courts have no such role to play in the impeachment process rests on my interpretation of the Constitution. His analysis seems to focus specifically upon the text of the constitutional grant to the Senate of the sole power to try impeachments and upon the framers' intentional exclusion of the Judiciary from a role in the impeachment process, rather than upon the political question doctrine.
Judge Edwards concurred in the judgment but dissented in part. He would have found former Judge Nixon's constitutional challenge justiciable, but would find "that the Senate's use of a special committee to hear witnesses and gather evidence did not deprive Nixon of any constitutionally protected right.
The Nixon case was decided by the Supreme Court on January 13, Nixon v. The Court held the issue before them to be nonjusticiable. The Chief Justice based this conclusion upon the fact that the impeachment proceedings were textually committed in the Constitution to the legislative branch. In addition, the Court found the "lack of finality and the difficulty in fashioning relief counsel[led] against justiciability.
To open "the door of judicial review to the procedures used by the Senate in trying impeachments would 'expose the political life of the country to months, or perhaps years, of chaos. The Court found that the word "try" in the Impeachment Clause did not "provide an identifiable textual limit on the authority which is committed to the Senate.
Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, emphasized the significance of the framers' decision to assign the impeachment power to the legislative branch. Justice White, joined by Justice Blackmun, concurred in the judgment, but found nothing in the Constitution to foreclose the Court's consideration of the constitutional sufficiency of the Senate's Rule XI procedure.
Justices White and Blackmun, addressing the merits of the claim before the Court, were of the opinion that the Senate had fulfilled its constitutional obligation to "try" Judge Nixon. Justice Souter agreed with the majority that the case presented a nonjusticiable political question, although his reasoning was somewhat different.
The Impeachment Trial Clause commits to the Senate "the sole Power to try all Impeachments," subject to three procedural requirements: the Senate shall be on oath or affirmation; the Chief Justice shall preside when the President is tried; and conviction shall be upon the concurrence of two-thirds of the Members present. It seems fair to conclude that the Clause contemplates that the Senate may determine, within broad boundaries, such subsidiary issues as the procedures for receipt and consideration of evidence necessary to satisfy its duty to "try" impeachments.
Justice Souter found the conclusion that the case presented a non-justiciable political question supported by the "'the unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made,' [and] 'the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements from various departments on one question.
Carr , U. He noted, however, that. In such circumstances, the Senate's action might be so far beyond the scope of its constitutional authority, and the consequent impact on the Republic so great, as to merit a judicial response despite the prudential concerns that would ordinarily counsel silence. The court there framed the question before it as follows:.
The key issue in this case is whether a life-tenured Article III judge who has been acquitted of felony charges by a petit jury can thereafter be impeached and tried for essentially the same alleged indiscretion by a committee of the United States Senate consisting of less than the full Senate.
This court determines that the answer is no. Judge Sporkin determined that his court was not foreclosed from reaching a decision in the Hastings case by what might have been viewed as a controlling court of appeals decision in Nixon , because the Supreme Court had agreed to take certiorari in Nixon on issues identical to those before him.
Judge Sporkin concluded that the issue before him was justiciable and, further, that the Rule XI procedure did not provide an adequate "trial" before the full Senate. In particular, the court considered the taking of evidence a process which required the presence of all the Senators, so that each could judge credibility with his or her own eyes and ears.
Judge Sporkin stayed his judgment pending appeal. After the Supreme Court's decision in Nixon v. United States, supra , the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, on its own motion, vacated and remanded the Hastings decision for reconsideration in light of Nixon. Hastings v. On remand, Judge Sporkin dismissed the case. In doing so reluctantly, Judge Sporkin emphasized the factual differences between the two cases, but concluded that the Nixon decision compelled dismissal of the case before him.
Also of great assistance in exploring precedents in this area is Deschler's Precedents of the United States House of Representatives, ch. Holmes Brown and Charles W. Senate conduct of impeachment trials is governed by the "Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate when Sitting on Impeachment Trials.
Claiborne, although many of the rules predate the Claiborne impeachment. August 15, , was prepared at the time of the Claiborne proceeding pursuant to S. As these are Senate rules, that body can, where it deems such action appropriate, revise or amend the rules. Consideration of the appropriateness of such revisions is not unusual when a Senate impeachment trial is anticipated or is at a very early stage of the Senate proceedings.
In any impeachment inquiry, the Members of the legislative branch must confront some preliminary questions to determine whether an impeachment is appropriate in a given situation. The first of these questions is whether the individual whose conduct is under scrutiny falls within the category of President, Vice President, or "civil Officers of the United States" such that he is vulnerable to impeachment. One facet of this question in some cases is whether the resignation of the individual under scrutiny forecloses further impeachment proceedings against him.
A second preliminary question is whether the conduct involved constitutes "treason, bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors. In the history of the United States, 16 full impeachment trials have taken place. Delahay, of the U. District Court for the District of Kansas, was begun when the Members of the House appeared before the bar of the Senate to impeach the judge at the end of the third session of the 34 th Congress. No articles of impeachment were presented at that time. After the judge resigned, there were no further proceedings.
An 18 th Senate trial, that of George W. English, U. District Judge for the Eastern District of Illinois, was commenced in the Senate, but did not go forward to a judgment on the merits of the case because of the judge's resignation and the House Managers' recommendation and the Senate's agreement that the impeachment proceedings be dismissed. Similarly, a 19 th Senate trial, regarding Samuel B.
Kent, U. District Judge for the Southern District of Texas, ended when the Senate agreed to a motion by Senator Harry Reid to dismiss the articles of impeachment after the judge resigned and the House Managers requested that the impeachment proceedings be discontinued. In addition to those impeachment investigations which have resulted in Senate trials, there have been a number of instances in which the impeachment process has been initiated in the House of Representatives that have not resulted in articles of impeachment being voted against the subjects of those inquiries.
For example, in , the House of Representatives adopted a resolution authorizing the House Committee on the Judiciary to investigate the conduct of District Judge Mark H. Other examples of impeachment resolutions, inquiries, or investigations regarding federal judges that, for various reasons, 59 did not result in articles of impeachment being voted by the House include those regarding: Lebbeus R.
United States , Ct. Constitution and 2 challenging the constitutional validity of a one-House veto provision in the Federal Salary Act of , 2 U. No further action was taken. Among the inquiries into conduct of executive branch officers which did not result in Senate trials were those regarding: H.
Daugherty ; Clarence C. Mellon, as Secretary of the Treasury discontinued before completion of the investigation because of Mellon's resignation from the position of Secretary of the Treasury upon his nomination and confirmation as Ambassador to the Court of St. Nixon President's resignation occurred before the Articles of Impeachment were voted upon by the House; report of the Judiciary Committee recommending impeachment and including articles of impeachment submitted to the House; House adopted a resolution accepting the report, noting the action of the committee and commending its chairman and Members for their efforts, but no further action was taken upon the impeachment ; and Andrew Young, United States Ambassador to the United Nations measure considered in House; motion to table passed by House.
The following are examples of those which went no further than committee or subcommittee referral: resolution to impeach the Ambassador to Iran referred to House Judiciary Committee ; resolution to impeach United States Ambassador to the United Nations referred to House Judiciary Committee ; resolution directing House Judiciary Committee to investigate whether to impeach Attorney General of United States referred to House Rules and Administration ; resolutions to impeach the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and referred to Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary ; resolutions to impeach members of the Federal Open Market Committee and referred to Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Judiciary Committee ; resolutions to impeach President Ronald Reagan and referred to House Judiciary Committee ; and resolutions to impeach President George W.
Bush two in , one in , two in referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary ; a resolution impeaching Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr referred to House Judiciary Committee ; 63 a resolution directing the House Committee on the Judiciary to undertake an inquiry into whether grounds existed to impeach President William Jefferson Clinton, to report its findings, and, if the committee so determined, a resolution of impeachment referred to House Committee on Rules ; 64 a resolution to impeach Secretary of Defense Donald R.
Gonzales should be impeached for high crimes and misdemeanors referred to the House Rules Committee. As is apparent from the instances noted above, the impeachment mechanism, while not used frequently, has provided a means of exploring allegations of misconduct involving, with the one notable exception of Senator Blount, civil officers from both the judicial and executive branches.
The bulk of the inquiries begun have not resulted in impeachment trials; of those which have gone to trial, less than half of them have led to convictions, all involving federal judges. The impeachment process provides a means of monitoring and checking misconduct by such officials through the use of a legislative forum.
The mechanism is a cumbersome one which takes time away from other legislative business. Yet its very cumbersomeness might be viewed as necessary to minimize the chance that so serious a course would be engaged in lightly; in this light, its complex and somewhat unwieldy nature could be considered an attempt to deter unwarranted legislative intrusions into the business and personnel of the other two branches.
The impeachment process might be seen as a constitutional effort to balance these two countervailing forces. A perusal of the examples included in the list of impeachment trials and of inquiries with an eye towards possible impeachment may provide some indication as to what sort of officials have been considered "civil Officers of the United States" within the scope of the impeachment powers. The term is not defined in the Constitution.
With the exception of the trial of Senator Blount, all of those listed above were from either the executive or the judicial branch. Senator Blount was not convicted in his impeachment trial. During that trial the Congress wrestled with the question of whether a Senator was a civil officer subject to impeachment. The Senate concluded that he was not and that it lacked jurisdiction over him for impeachment purposes.
He was acquitted on that basis. Clearly the precedents show that federal judges have been considered to fall within the sweep of the "Civil Officer" language. There have been instances where questions have been raised as to whether the congressional printer, 66 a former vice-consul-general, 67 or a territorial judge 68 could be impeached.
In addition, a House committee concluded that a Commissioner of the District of Columbia was not a civil officer for impeachment purposes. II, Sec. He shall Reliance in this argument is placed upon a statement of the Supreme Court in United States v. Mouat , U. Unless a person in the service of the government hold his place by virtue of an appointment by the President, or of one of the courts of justice or heads of departments authorized by law to make such an appointment, he is not, strictly speaking, an officer of the United States.
It is clear that a private citizen is not subject to impeachment, except as to those offenses committed while holding federal public office. Belknap resigned just prior to the adoption of impeachment articles by the House. The Senate, after having given exhaustive consideration to the arguments of the House managers and counsel for the respondent, concluded that the former Secretary of War was amenable to trial by impeachment for acts done in that office, despite his resignation from office before he was impeached.
Belknap's demurrer to the replication of the House on the ground that the Senate lacked jurisdiction to go forward with the impeachment was therefore overruled.
The second fundamental issue which each Congress contemplating impeachment of a federal official must confront is whether the conduct in question falls within the constitutional parameters of "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. III, Sec. The Constitution requires that a conviction on a charge of treason be supported by the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act or a confession in open court.
The statutory language expressly applies only to those owing allegiance to the United States. Bribery is not defined in the Constitution, although it was an offense at common law, and the First Congress enacted a bribery statute, the Act of April 30, , 1 Stat. The phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors" is not defined in the Constitution or in statute. It was used in many of the English impeachments, which were proceedings in which criminal sanctions could be imposed upon conviction.
As Alex Simpson, Jr. No definitive list of types of conduct falling within the "high crimes and misdemeanors" language has been forthcoming as a result of this debate, but some measure of clarification has emerged. Article 1, Section 3, Clause 7 appears to anticipate that some of the conduct within this ambit may also provide grounds for criminal prosecution. It indicates that the impeachment process does not foreclose judicial action.
Its phrasing might be regarded as implying that the impeachment proceedings would precede the judicial process, but, as is evident from the impeachments of Judge Claiborne in , and of Judges Hastings and Nixon in and , at least as to federal judges and probably as to most civil officers subject to impeachment under the Constitution, the impeachment process may also follow the conclusion of the criminal proceedings.
Whether impeachment and removal of a President must precede any criminal prosecution is as yet an unanswered question. The debate on the impeachable offenses during the Constitutional Convention in indicates that criminal conduct was at least part of what was included in the "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors" language. For example, Judge John Pickering was convicted on all four of the articles of impeachment brought against him.
Among those charges were allegations of mishandling a case before him in contravention of federal laws and procedures: 1 by delivering a ship which was the subject of a condemnation proceeding for violation of customs laws to the claimant without requiring bond to be posted after the ship had been attached by the marshal; 2 by refusing to hear some of the testimony offered by the United States in that case; and 3 by refusing to grant the United States an appeal despite the fact that the United States was entitled to an appeal as a matter of right under federal law.
A narrowly partisan impeachment effort is unlikely to result in a conviction and removal, and so House leaders have rarely thought impeachments are worth the effort unless members of the minority party are in agreement that impeachable offenses have been committed.
Third, the members of Congress are ultimately accountable to the voters for their actions. If the public is not convinced that an impeachment is justified, legislators are disinclined to risk their own reelection by tilting at windmills.
The Founders left a powerful weapon in the hands of Congress in the form of the impeachment power. Like all powers, the impeachment power is subject to misuse and abuse. The ultimate check on how that power is used is public sentiment. The burden is on those who think that an impeachment is appropriate to persuade others that the circumstances warrant taking such drastic measures.
Exercising the impeachment power requires the ability to reach across the political aisle and forge a political consensus that the danger of leaving an individual in power is too great to be risked.
In the absence of that consensus, legislators are forced to rely on the more mundane tools that they have at their disposal to check abuses of power and advance the public welfare. What sort of conduct is so harmful that Congress is justified in impeaching and removing an officer who commits it? It is open-ended for the reason many constitutional provisions are vague and open-ended.
Instead, the Constitution sets forth the general principle of impeachment and leaves its more specific definition to be developed by the House of Representatives and the Senate. But the Ford position goes too far. In fact, the Framers debated this phrase and settled on this formulation precisely to prohibit Congress from impeaching officers for any reason at all.
The Framers were determined to limit the grounds on which an officer could be impeached in order to safeguard another constitutional principle: the separation of powers. It is clear that, in our constitutional system of government, the executive branch the President, the cabinet, and other officers subordinate to the President and the judiciary the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts are to be independent from the legislature the House of Representatives and the Senate.
The Framers recognized the potential for impeachment to undermine this principle. It is a well-established legal principle that the power to remove is the power to control. The President, for example, can control the agencies of the executive branch principally because the President can remove the heads of the agencies such as cabinet secretaries for any reason at all, including for not following an order from the President.
They are said to serve at-will because the President can remove them at will. If Congress can impeach and remove the President or Supreme Court Justices for any reason at all, then these officers serve at the will of Congress and are subject to its control. If the phrase is given a less rigorous interpretation, it could allow Congress to influence and control the President and the courts.
There is a second constitutional principle at stake in defining the scope of the impeachment power: our commitment to democracy. Allowing Congress to remove Presidents, and executive officers who serve under them, has the effect of thwarting the will of the people.
After all, the President is elected to serve a four-year term. How, in a democracy, can we justify giving Congress or anyone other than the people, for that matter the power to overrule a presidential election? This can only be justified on the ground that the President has committed acts so dangerous to the public that the President may not be allowed to remain in office until the next election.
Imagine, for example, if it were discovered that a President was secretly a spy and agent for a foreign power. In that sort of case all would agree that the danger to our constitutional system of government, indeed to our nationhood, is such that it is impractical to wait for a presidential election to remove the President. The Framers agreed on this point too. But this emphasizes just how important it is to limit the power to truly egregious conduct and serious harms to the public.
Otherwise, this narrow and speculative potential could undermine our basic commitment to democracy.
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